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OUR TOPIC-"THE CITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY"-is truly
daunting. In preparing my remarks, I took some solace from the real-
ization that a seminar that I have taught several times has forced me to
contemplate how municipal affairs evolve over the centuries. I have
named the seminar Urban Legal History: The Development of New
Haven. As this title suggests, its focus is on the regulation of the physi-
cal development, since its founding in 1638, of the Connecticut city in
which my law school is located. The seminar has proven to be exceed-
ingly popular with law students. It enables them to study legal issues
in context. Local libraries, historical societies, and government offices
all contain primary materials for the seminar's students to excavate.
Facing an audience of law professors who teach courses in urban gov-
ernment, I recommend that each of you consider offering a seminar on
the legal history of your law school's municipality. Lynn Baker, for
example, could present one on Austin; Bill Buzbee, on Atlanta; and
Georgette Poindexter, on Philadelphia. Because New York City is so
large, Richard Briffault's ambitions might have to be restricted to
Morningside Heights, and Clay Gillette's to Greenwich Village.
Because the title of this panel session invites each of us to be more
speculative than academicians usually are, I cannot resist taking a fling
in the impossible art of forecasting the future. My topic today is the
likely effect of the ongoing digital revolution-of the Internet, inter-
active television, portable telephones, and so forth-on the quality of
* This article is an edited version of remarks delivered as a participant in a program
on "The City in the 21st Century." The State and Local Government Law Section of
the Association of American Law Schools, the sponsor of the program, convened it in
Washington, D.C., on January 8, 2000. I thank Lynn Baker for assistance.
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urban governance. In tackling this topic, like most of the other speakers
I generally adopt a "rational choice" perspective on local politics. This
theory supposes that voters, elected officials, lobbyists, bureaucrats, and
the other players on the municipal stage are inclined to rationally pursue
the interests they hold dear, including their own self-interest. According
to the rational actor approach, the basic challenge of city governance
is to prevent those who govern a city from feathering their own nests.
To prevent insider abuse, voters, journalists, and other monitors must
have the ability to obtain the information needed to limit official mis-
conduct, have the incentive to gather that information, and have the
power to sanction local officials who misbehave.
At first blush, the digital revolution might be predicted to result in
better citizen monitoring of local politicians. Internet sites surely could
ease a citizen's burden of gathering information about local government
budgets. E-mail could ease the burden of communicating with like-
minded neighbors who might be allies in preventing governmental
abuses. In addition, the new communications systems, by enabling
more people to work at home, may sharpen incentives to monitor the
politicians who govern one's place of residence. Despite these likely
positive effects, I speculate-in part to provoke reactions from my com-
mentators-that the digital revolution of the twenty-first century, on
balance, actually will worsen the quality of urban government, particu-
larly in central cities.
I. How Cyber-Technology May Weaken
Local Governments
Information-age technologies may have at least three baneful conse-
quences for civic life. In brief preview, they may increase the cohesion
of special interests, distract citizens from local affairs, and erode local
social capital. I contend that these negative effects possibly may out-
weigh any beneficial effects these same technologies may have on ur-
ban governance.
First, the same communications technologies that help voters moni-
tor politicians may also help members of selfish interest groups to mo-
bilize and capture municipal government to the detriment of the general
citizenry. In general, members of a concentrated interest group are more
likely than diffuse voters to overcome the free-riding problem that
threatens to stymie collective action.' For example, owners of taxicabs
1. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53-65 (1965).
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who desire to limit the supply of licensed taxis in a city will find that
e-mail and teleconferencing will ease their efforts to lobby for carteli-
zation of their industry. While these same information technologies also
would assist organization of a countervailing lobby of riders of taxis,
it is plausible that the riding public simply will remain too diffuse to
organize an anti-cartel effort.
Second, by aggravating information overload, the cyber-revolution
likely will prompt most Americans to pay less and less attention to
local affairs. In ancient Greece, the debate at the agora over the affairs
of the polis was the best form of intellectual stimulation available. But
when a home computer enables a citizen to listen to any radio station,
download any film, watch any sporting event, and participate in any
auction, the opportunity costs of attending a municipal hearing will be
much higher than previously. The per capita circulation of daily news-
papers, a basic source of information about local politics, has been
falling for decades.2 Twenty-somethings are increasingly likely to learn
about events of the day through websites that feature national and in-
ternational news. When the entire world is at one's fingertips, one's
attentiveness to merely local affairs is likely to wane.
Third, the new digital technologies are likely to weaken the local
social networks that help sustain effective citizen monitoring of mu-
nicipal government. A century ago, most of the important persons in
an individual's life likely resided within a few blocks, or at most a few
miles, from the individual's own residence. Prior to the advent of the
long-distance telephone call, the interstate highway, and the inexpen-
sive airplane flight, the costs of maintaining relationships with those at
great distance tended to be prohibitive.
Not any more. Assume, for example, that for professors who spe-
cialize in urban law, the most important peers are the members of the
State and Local Government Law Section of the Association of Amer-
ican Law Schools. With e-mail and websites, Section members now
can keep in touch with each other-although admittedly without face-
to-face contact-as readily as neighbors who live a half-mile apart.
There are limits on the amount of time a person can devote to social
engagements. With the advent of new information technologies, an in-
dividual is apt to decide to devote more energy to maintaining and
deepening social bonds with individuals with whom he already has
2. The per capita circulation of daily newspapers in the United States fell from 0.30
in 1970 to 0.21 in 1998. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES-1999, at 589.
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thick relational bonds-kinfolk, high school and college friends, pro-
fessional associates, fellow hobbyists-even though many of these in-
dividuals might be physically distant. The upshot is that less social
energy is likely to be devoted to cementing good relations with neigh-
bors. While neighbors do share concerns about the quality of their im-
mediate physical environment, that common interest by itself is likely
to be a relatively slender social bond.
Robert Putnam, a leading scholar of social trends, asserts that social
capital in the United States is eroding.' My prediction is more cabined:
as the twenty-first century progresses, social capital will steadily de-
cline among persons whose sole common tie is the geographic propin-
quity of their residences. This trend, if it indeed comes to pass, will
bode ill for the quality of local government. Local organizations and
social networks are mechanisms that help overcome a citizen's natural
tendency to free ride in monitoring against malfeasance at city hall.
Where local social capital is abundant, a champion of the public interest
can anticipate winning enhanced esteem from peers. Where local social
capital is thin, a potential champion of the public may anticipate that
good civic deeds will go relatively unnoticed.
H. Why Big Cities May Suffer More
than Small Cities
These three baneful consequences, should they indeed come to pass,
would not affect all local governments equally. In the interests of brev-
ity, I consider the implications for just two stylized localities: a small
suburban municipality and an aging central city.
A bedroom suburb tends to be relatively easy for its residents to
monitor. Suburban issues tend to be simple and familiar. Because of
both natural clustering and deliberate zoning, suburban voters also tend
to be relatively homogeneous, a feature that lubricates their social in-
teractions. "Homevoters," to use William Fischel's neologism, 4 typi-
cally dominate suburban politics. A suburb official would be loath to
subordinate their interests to those of rent-seeking special interests.
Indeed, the persistent concern is not that a small suburb will be un-
responsive to its electorate, but rather that it will be too responsive.
Suburban politics are apt to promote the parochial interests of resident
3. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
4. William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence
Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies (Dec. 28, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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homevoters to the detriment of the regional welfare. The litany of
wrongs is familiar-exclusionary zoning, strict growth controls,
NIMBYism. There's no reason to suppose that twenty-first century
technologies will curb suburban selfishness. Indeed, because transpor-
tation improvements are likely to foster ever greater social differenti-
ation among suburbs, tendencies toward local parochialism may well
increase in the coming years.
The erosion of local social capital would be particularly damaging
in a central city. To underscore this point, I now recap the most dire
scenario imaginable for the twenty-first century (one that I dearly hope
is overly bleak): As information-age technologies take hold, residents
of central cities pay less attention to local politics because they are
increasingly distracted by the new forms of electronic diversion and
because the thinning of local social capital has lessened informal in-
centives for civic involvement. The growing inattention to local affairs
manifests itself in declining voter turnouts in municipal elections and
slumping circulation of local newspapers. At the same time, members
of rent-seeking interest groups learn to use the new technologies to
enhance their political power. Special interests also are strengthened by
the increasing social segregation of metropolitan housing. This pattern
fosters the emergence of one-party politics in central cities, thereby
eliminating the organized opposition with the greatest incentive to
monitor against municipal malfeasance.5 With their relative power
much enhanced in central cities, special interests use their political
leverage to enact new forms of wasteful municipal regulatory and
spending programs. These programs serve the interests of their mem-
bers at the expense of the general citizenry.
To enhance the concreteness and credibility of this dire scenario, I
identify some of the special interests that already have gained inordinate
power in New Haven, the subject of my seminar. First, there are the
unions that represent the employees of the city of New Haven, the
Board of Education, the Housing Authority, and the other components
of local government. These unions tend to wield their influence on
behalf of their leaders and senior members at the expense of public
welfare. For instance, in New Haven the current teacher's union con-
tract grants relatively generous salaries to senior teachers, but grants
the lowest salaries in the metropolitan region to entry-level teachers. 6
Standardized-test scores of New Haven students are far below those of
5. One-party politics already is the order of the day both in New Haven and in
Washington, D.C., where this program is being convened.
6. See Paul Bass, Kids First?, NEw HAVEN ADVOc., Oct. 7, 1999, at 11.
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students in suburban school districts.7 New Haven pupils likely would
benefit greatly from an infusion of energetic new teachers into the sys-
tem. The union, however, is more interested in rewarding senior teach-
ers (even poorly performing ones) than in attracting fresh talent. Be-
cause monitoring by parents and voters has been weak, the teachers'
union has had its way.
A second group with its tentacles around New Haven is the public
works lobby. In most central cities, some firms in the construction sec-
tor specialize in securing public contracts. At the New Haven Board of
Education, a main beneficiary of pork barrel politics has been the
developer/architect Wendell Harp, whose wife is a state senator. An even
more prominent example is the Fusco Corporation, whose involvement
with public works contracting in New Haven dates back sixty years to
the beginning of the public housing program. Individuals associated with
Fusco have been the biggest recent contributors to the campaigns of the
current mayor of New Haven, John DeStefano, Jr. For years the mayor
has been pushing hard to secure state and local subsidies to help finance
the development of a major shopping center in New Haven, to sit near
the intersection of two Interstate highways. And-surprise, surprise-
the mayor has ensured that the Fusco Corporation will have a large piece
of this shopping center deal. For six decades, New Haven has fed its
public works lobby a wide variety of projects involving public housing,
urban renewal, and "public-private partnerships." Most of these ventures
have turned out to be wasteful drains on the scarce resources of the city.
Another powerful interest group is the "poverty services industry,"
whose presence in New Haven is mirrored in most big cities. Because
poverty-services specialists typically are flush with good intentions,
many of them would detest the label I just have pinned on them. They
survive by obtaining grants and contracts from a welter of government
and foundation sources. Their funding commonly can be traced to
some federal program, for example, to Community Development Block
Grants, HOPE VI, or Empowerment Zones. Although the details of
local antipoverty programs vary endlessly, few of them have proved to
be cost-justified. In New Haven, the Dixwell Community Development
Corporation serves as a splendid example. For thirty years this anti-
poverty organization squandered most of the city funds it regularly
received, but stayed afloat on account of the political contacts of its
leader, Pete Gray.8
7. See NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Nov. 4, 1999, at A12 (reporting, by school district,
the scores of tenth graders on the Connecticut Academic Performance Test).
8. See Angela Carter, Agency Could Get $55,000, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Mar. 23,
1999, at A3 (noting city administration's support of continued funding of the Dixwell
CDC, "which has little to show for more than $900,000 in grants during this decade").
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Many other examples could be marshaled. Central cities commonly
have entrenched "growth machines," perhaps Chamber of Commerce
leaders eager to spend public funds on dubious convention centers,
ballparks, and the like. Whatever the particulars, the general point is
that residents and landowners in central cities must bear the financial
burden of supporting inefficient special-interest programs. The net
"taxes" that a central city imposes to feed its municipal unions, public
works lobby, poverty industry, and other insiders end up being capi-
talized into lower property values. In most central cities, a neighbor-
hood that seceded to form its own municipality would immediately
experience a surge in housing prices.
III. How to Help the Central City
If the root of central-city problems is capture by interest groups, the
basic remedy is shifting decision-making power to participants in in-
stitutions that are less vulnerable to private influence. For instance, if
the interest groups that thrive at city hall were to be relatively weak at
the statehouse, state statutory reforms might free cities from the grip
of their captors.9
If politically feasible, a basic reform strategy is state legislation that
facilitates a city resident's ability to "exit" (and, just as important, to
threaten to exit) from inefficient local public monopolies over munic-
ipal services. Three reforms can serve as illustrations. First, a state
legislature could reduce the legal impediments to a neighborhood's
secession from its city. Because balkanization can cause new problems,
some constraints on secession remain appropriate. In most states today,
however, secession is almost impossible. This eliminates an important
method of deterring central-city politicians from catering to special
interests.
Second, to enable parents of school children to escape local educa-
tion monopolies, states can enable school choice by means of school
vouchers and charter schools. It is baffling that so many observers who
wish to alleviate urban poverty nevertheless oppose school choice. Con-
After years of near total dereliction of duty by Gray, political pressure mounted and
the city finally terminated financial support to his organization. See Angela Carter, City
Slashes Funding to Developer: Dixwell Nonprofit Has Little Success, Review Discov-
ers, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, June 24, 1999, at Al. Had Gray been a bit better at going
through the motions of delivering services, his organization likely would have contin-
ued to receive city funding.
9. State politics themselves hardly are trouble-free. In practice, the interest groups
that buzz around statehouses might support initiatives that would aggravate urban
problems.
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cerns about the policies that alternative schools might pursue can be
addressed through standards for school accreditation. If New Haven
had a more competitive schooling market, the teachers' union would
find it harder to depress the salaries of energetic young hires.
Third, a state legislature can authorize the creation of small special-
services districts within cities. A notable example is the business im-
provement district (BID). The BID is one of the great innovations in
local government law in the past several decades. 10 There are now more
than a thousand of them in the United States. They appear to have
played an important role in the comeback of New York City, where
they have engaged in such activities as graffiti removal, sidewalk clean-
ing, and street decoration.
Building on the idea of the BID, two years ago I urged state legis-
latures to authorize, on an experimental basis, owners of property
within a small residential district of a few adjoining city blocks to create
a block improvement district (BLID). 11 In essence, a BLID would be a
retrofitted residential community association, an institution that has
proven to be immensely popular in new residential developments. A
BLID would have to be approved by affirmative vote by the owners of
a supermajority of the real property within district boundaries. Once in
existence, it could impose mandatory assessments on all district prop-
erty owners and use the proceeds to fund the provision of local public
goods, such as a block watch, landscaping, and block parties. While
walking in lower Manhattan recently, I observed a placard by a street
tree that proclaimed that the tree had been "adopted" by a particular
resident. Surely a small BLID would be better able than New York City
itself to administer an "adopt a tree" program.
Several features of BIDs and BLIDs are likely to make them more
efficient than cities. Their relatively small size helps reduce free riding
in monitoring by constituents. More important, the directors of a special
district typically are elected by the owners of property within the dis-
trict. Because the benefits and costs of the special district's activities
are mostly capitalized into the value of district real estate, this voting
system promotes efficient administration. To illustrate, property owners
would favor the planting of cost-justified street trees, even if those trees
10. As far as I know, no law professor had any significant hand in the invention of
the BID. We legal academicians at least can take a bit of solace from the fact that
panelist Richard Briffault has become a leading authority on these institutions. See
Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and
Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 365 (1999).
11. Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75
(1998).
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would take a long time to mature, while short-term tenants residing in
a district might oppose the plantings on the rationale that they would
never see more than saplings.
Because small special districts such as BIDs and BLIDs are relatively
resistant to interest group capture, these micro-territorial institutions
are likely to have increasing promise in the decades to come. Moreover,
in a more speculative vein, BLIDs might serve to offset some of the
likely deleterious effects of the twenty-first century information tech-
nologies on the stock of local social capital. Neighbors who meet face-
to face to govern a BLID could use those social contacts as a spring-
board for joint involvement in civic life beyond the immediate
neighborhood. The punch line is this: the quality of life in the twenty-
first century will depend in part on the ability of lawyers and legisla-
tures to invent new institutional mechanisms that will serve to repair
some of the social damage that the new information technologies are
likely to bring in their wake.
IV. Final Thoughts
Because a number of panelists are addressing the issue of "sprawl," I'll
end by offering a few thoughts on that subject. Most metropolitan areas
in the United States undoubtedly are less compact than they would be
if optimal governmental policies were in effect. Nevertheless, many
critics of "sprawl" misidentify the chief culprits. Critics typically point
the finger at counties and municipalities in the urban fringe (the "ex-
urbs") where local officials are thought to be overly cozy with devel-
opers.12 The critics' solution: regulate the growth of the exurbs, perhaps
through imposition of an urban growth boundary. In contrast, I attribute
the pattern of excessive sprawl largely to the failings of governments
in both the central city and established suburbs. When a central city is
unusually vulnerable to capture by rent-seeking groups, that dysfunc-
tion prompts central-city firms and households to migrate to greener
pastures in the suburbs. Because many established suburbs practice
exclusionary zoning, however, an unnaturally large share of new de-
velopment is forced out to even more remote sites in the exurbs. If this
analysis is correct, the precise policy response to the problem of sprawl
is to reform central city and suburban governments, an approach that
would reduce development pressure on the exurbs. If we are in a sec-
ond-best world where reform of neither the dysfunctional central city
12. Many critics of sprawl also argue that there is excessive subsidization of exurban
infrastructure.
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nor the exclusionary suburb is politically feasible, allowing develop-
ment to sprawl into the exurbs is a generally desirable policy. To cut
off this escape valve likely would create a scarcity in development sites
that would increase metropolitan housing prices to the net detriment of
the typical household. 3
13. Most studies have found that growth controls raise housing prices. See ROBERT
C. ELLICKSON & VicKi L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 995-96 (2d ed. 2000).
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